Unjust Enrichment

The terms “restitution” and “unjust enrichment” are the modern designations for the older “quasi contracts” terminology.[1] The Washington court has adopted the unjust enrichment terminology, but continues to use the quasi contractual terminology interchangeably:

“Quasi contracts” are not true contracts but are obligations created by the law when money or property has been placed in one person's possession under such circumstances that in equity and good conscience, he ought not to retain it. [Citation omitted.] Thus, the substance of an action for unjust enrichment lies in a promise, implied by law, that one will render to the person entitled thereto that which in equity and good conscience, belongs to the latter. At common law, such actions are brought under the principles of assumpsit, and where the cause of action arises from a tortious wrong, it is the general rule, whether or not there be an express contract, that the injured party may waive the tort and sue in assumpsit, in which case the law will imply a contract on the part of the tort-feasor to pay the injured party a just remuneration for the damages suffered to his property.[2]

In unjust enrichment terms, two basic elements must be established in quasi-contractual actions: the person receiving a benefit (such as money) must be unjustly enriched, and the party conferring the benefit must not be a volunteer.[3] Thus, to satisfy the first requirement to recover on a claim for money had and received, for example, the plaintiff must base the claim that the defendant has been unjustly enriched on some recognized equitable principle such as money paid under mistake,[4] coercion, duress, fraud, illegality of contract, impossibility of performance, or failure to perform a fiduciary duty, and the defendant must retain the money received or the benefit of the money received so as to be enriched.[5] Whether one acts as a volunteer depends on the circumstances of each case, including (1) whether benefits were conferred at the request of the party benefited, (2) whether the party benefited knew of the payment but stood back and let the party make the payment, and (3) whether the benefits were necessary to protect the interests of the party who conferred the benefit or the party who benefited by the payment.[6]

There are no attorney fees recoverable under the unjust enrichment theory.

See Attorney Fees for exceptions.

[1] 27 WAPRAC § 5.51.

[2] Bill v. Gattavara, 34 Wash. 2d 645, 209 P.2d 457 (1949) (4-1 decision).

[3] Lynch v. Deaconess Medical Center, 113 Wash. 2d 162, 776 P.2d 681 (1989); Trane Co. v. Randolph Plumbing & Heating, 44 Wash. App. 438, 722 P.2d 1325 (Div. 3 1986). A fuller discussion of unjust enrichment theory appears in Chandler v. Washington Toll Bridge Authority, 17 Wash. 2d 591, 137 P.2d 97 (1943). See also Farwest Steel Corp. v. Mainline Metal Works, Inc., 48 Wash. App. 719, 741 P.2d 58 (Div. 1 1987) (calling quantum meruit and unjust enrichment theories inseparable).

[4] E.g., King County v. Odman, 8 Wash. 2d 32, 111 P.2d 228, 133 A.L.R. 1440 (1941) (action by owner of property to recover rentals mistakenly paid to former owner of the property).

[5] See Coast Trading Co., Inc. v. Parmac, Inc., 21 Wash. App. 896, 587 P.2d 1071, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1047 (Div. 1 1978) (defendant not enriched when it had paid money due plaintiff to plaintiff's former agent). Farwest Steel Corp. v. Mainline Metal Works, Inc., 48 Wash. App. 719, 741 P.2d 58 (Div. 1 1987) (prime contractor was enriched through material supplied to its material supplier by plaintiffs, but there was no showing that enrichment was unjust where there was no showing of bad faith or misleading and no showing that contractor contributed to plaintiff's loss).

[6] Ellenburg v. Larson Fruit Co., Inc., 66 Wash. App. 246, 835 P.2d 225 (Div. 3 1992).